WX: Political Intelligence Entity

I have a radical idea to put forward. It is by no means fully formed, and undoubtedly there will be holes through which one might propel a WW1-era dreadnought.

Before I go any further, let me state in clear terms, that I neither encourage, support, nor condone, the use of physical violence as an offensive tactic against our political and ideological opponents. If for no other reason than that such behaviour would discredit and undermine our cause and feed the uncontested false narratives about us that already exist.

Despite some of the terms I may use in the following text, I intend such words to be interpreted in a purely non-violent manner. I will mention examples from historical armed conflict, however they are only intended to illustrate the underlying theory of my concept, and where I feel that other examples either cannot be found or would not suffice.

Let’s get down to business.

We need a new type of intelligence service: An independent, civil, non-state, intelligence entity to co-ordinate the defence of our values and institutions, and assist in degrading the ability and willingness of those who would seek to annihilate the same. For simplicity, and until a more appropriate descriptor becomes known, let’s call it a P.I.E., a Political Intelligence Entity.

It must be self-evident that such an entity is necessary.

“But wait,” I hear some of you say, “We already have a number of organisations which research and present policy options to the various levels of government.”

You are correct. However the purpose of a P.I.E. would not be to influence policy directly, but to undermine and deteriorate the ability of our enemy to do the same, by targeting its various ‘combatant’ elements.

We can debate into the night about the efficiency and level of influence right-of-centre think-tanks and policy institutes have had in guiding both public debate and legislative activity, however I believe there is little to be gained by continuing with the same tired, worn approach.

The current approach I would describe as passive or ‘soft’ persuasion. Soft persuasion only works if you already have a connection, understanding, or prior relationship with your target audience. By this I mean that with no substantial, authoritative, conservative presence in mainstream Australian political life right now, the presentation of policy alternatives as a stand-alone strategy is doomed. That may change if Bernardi’s Australian Conservatives manage to bulk-up and strike an assertive pose. However even if they do just that, the vice-like grip the forces of darkness now hold on multiple aspects of our public and private lives, will still be resoundingly strong.

A more strategic approach, parallel to any conservative political gains, is required to effect long-lasting structural change. Such change will only come about after our enemies are weakened. Hence the concept of a P.I.E. to co-ordinate such an outcome.

In 1968 during the Second Indochina War – more commonly known in the West as the Vietnam War – the South Vietnamese and their primary ally, the United States of America, attempted to consolidate a myriad of intelligence gathering and analysis entities into one ‘web.’ Intelligence from a variety of sources and agencies was to be fed into this web, analysed, and then disseminated to the various action arms such as the National Police Special Branch and Field Force, and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs). The South Vietnamese named their process ‘Phung Hoang’ after a mythical bird, and the Americans named their parallel but interconnected effort ‘Phoenix.’ The Phoenix Program became one of the most enduring myths of the Vietnam War, however I have no intention of discussing its merits or otherwise here. For now, however, all that is relevant is that the intention of Phung Hoang/Phoenix was to simplify the intelligence war against what was named the VCI, or Viet Cong Infrastructure. The VCI were the support elements that enabled the Viet Cong and later NVA main forces to operate militarily, and consisted of individuals who performed civil functions such as tax collecting, local law and order, and political indoctrination; as well as military support functions such as recruitment, intelligence-gathering, supply, and establishment and security of bases. Without the VCI, the guerrilla war could not have succeeded, either by itself or as an adjunct to the North Vietnamese Army’s divisions.

In theory, the Phung Hoang/Phoenix ‘web’ maintained intelligence collation centres in each of South Vietnam’s government-controlled districts and provinces. The intelligence gathered by forces in the field was supposed to be processed by each centre and then disseminated to the action arm most able to act upon it.

In practice, the relative simplicity of the Phung Hoang/Phoenix concept often fell apart for a variety of reasons, including interagency competition and distrust, poor leadership, and corruption. However, that again is a topic for another post.

As loose as this analogy is, our ideological enemies also possess an ‘infrastructure’ which supports them, though we might debate how much of that infrastructure is aware of and consciously supports the identified goals of their ‘main force.’ Similarly, we could argue that the ‘main force’ itself is by no means centrally controlled, co-operative, coherent, or even in agreement regarding strategy. Just because a threat is structured differently from historic enemies, however, does not mean that it is less capable of inflicting damage.

The point I’m trying to make is that those individuals or entities we identify as posing a danger to our way of life, only exist because underlying networks support them. The seat of a chair does not hover of its own accord: it must be supported by legs or a base in some form. Weaken or sever one or more of those legs and the seat of the chair becomes less able to perform its function. If you only attack the seat, however, and leave the legs that support it, the seat may eventually be replaced. Certainly the legs can be replaced also, but the intention is not to leave the seat, rather neutralise the legs first, so that the seat is weaker. Once the seat is weak enough, it too is targeted. No smart strategist attacks a stronger foe unless there are no other options. Weaken your target before you attack it.

We currently have no such entity or organisation dedicated to strategically defending our institutions and values. Let me reiterate that I’m not talking about policy-making. Without the means of having our policies adopted and implemented, arguing the case for such policies by themselves is a remarkable waste of time and energy. We must ‘prepare the ground’ first, by intelligently and in a  co-ordinated manner, assessing what obstacles our preferred policies face, and then devising and implementing a plan to achieve the reduction of such obstacles.

Simply pointing out hypocrisy or irrationality or a lack of empirical proof has so far not worked. We need a different approach.

Hence the concept of a P.I.E., which would: 1) Search for weaknesses in the enemy. 2) Exploit those weaknesses. 3). Monitor and assess the results.

What specifically might a P.I.E. do? It might:

Undermine public and political confidence in a taxpayer-funded media organisation.

Encourage or facilitate the targeting of a specific media organisation by its competitors.

Foment or aggravate internal conflict within a political party by marginalising key identities.

Seek to re-brand so-called ‘Green’ groups, by questioning their motives and focus on the ‘corporate’ nature of their funding.

SSM, constitutional vandalism, misandry as a virtue; the potential tasks are numerous.

Two key concepts here are Delegitimisation and Destabilisation.

How might these ambitious tasks be achieved?

We might achieve these goals in part by using the tools that our ideological enemies have used for decades: Propaganda and Psychological Operations.

Needless to say, these activities will take place strictly within the boundaries of the law, however that still leaves a wide space in which to operate.

During the Second World War, psychological warfare was one of the tools used to influence the behaviour of the enemy. In the South West Pacific Area, it was the domain initially of the Australian F.E.L.O. (Far Eastern Liaison Office), and then of the U.S. Psychological Warfare Branch (though FELO continued operating in the Australian and British domains).

The two agencies mentioned utilised four types of propaganda, which were, concisely: propaganda of despair, division, subversion, and enlightenment.

There is not the space here to enlarge upon those, however while the rapid development of communications technology has rendered some of the techniques of 75 years ago obsolete, the underlying theory, based on human psychology, may still be useful.

Who might be our ‘targets?’

We might loosely categorise our targets for propaganda as Hardcore and Softcore, and tailor our methods accordingly.

Arguing about ideology with the Hardcore is unlikely to change their behaviour, as they often possess inbuilt defences against rational debate. An initial strategy for the Hardcore might be to allow or encourage them to overreach; facilitate their self-destruction. Undermining their authority or standing amongst Softcore followers may assist this end goal.

The Softcore are more susceptible to being ‘infected’ and therefore a more achievable target audience, though arguing about ideology with the Softcore may not resonate as much as practical matters, such as what affects themselves and their families. Show respect for their intentions in their beliefs, and sympathise that they have been misled, but at the same time, chisel away at their morale. Concurrently work on undermining their faith in their leaders.

The goal when working on the Softcore is to metaphorically separate the ‘head’ from the ‘body.’ The former is the decision-making, most publically visible element of the issue or cause, the latter being those who, on various levels, support or ‘prop-up’ the former, either due to a belief arising from misinformation, or the perception of a lack of a viable alternative.

The body provides nutrients to the head (the brain), without which it will eventually wither and die.

A Political Intelligence Entity would need a counter-propaganda response, as it also would a counter-intelligence element for internal security, for we know how well-funded and motivated our enemies are.

There are many questions posed by the concept of a P.I.E. Two such questions are: ‘To whom would the information gathered be disbursed?’ and ‘How and from where would funding be sourced?’

The dissemination of information could be filtered, however I’m unwilling to expand beyond that statement in a public forum, and ideally, it would be preferable for the P.I.E. to be independent.

Intelligence (information) would be gathered from both open, public sources, and also by infiltration or influence. Nothing illegal, mind you, simply ‘participative.’ How that could be achieved is also a conversation for behind closed doors.

The P.I.E. acronym has been chosen, temporarily, because of its potential absurdity. Imagine your favourite Pravda newsreader: “In breaking news, the far right has created a pie.” What the? How do give such a statement gravity? The more ambiguous or confusing the label for this project is, the better. The task of the P.I.E. is not to seek popularity or acceptance. It will operate more effectively leaning calmly against a wall, in the shadows, quietly observing. No name tag, no introductions.

As with most of the above, however, the name is not set in stone.

Another poster on here (Buddy?) has, once or twice in the past, made mention of counterinsurgency theory as a lens through which to view some of the political/social/cultural challenges that confront us. Unless I’ve missed it, he/she has not elaborated upon this, but I consider it not such a radical idea, for two reasons.

Firstly because some of those who are trying to harm us and our way of life, openly self-identify as insurgents or revolutionaries, and have published strategies to achieve the change they desire. These strategies are unashamedly destructive. The hijacked conservation movement, for example, advocate pro-poverty policies.

The feral, anti-Trump rabble in the U.S. proudly and without any acknowledgement of delusion, calls itself a ‘resistance,’ and some profoundly impaired juvendults publicly identify as ‘climate change insurgents.’

Secondly, viewing our challenge through the prism of counter-insurgency – making appropriate adjustments of course for the civil, non-violent nature of the self-proclaimed ‘insurgents’ – would force us to view our enemies as a threat, rather than a mere inconvenience or nuisance that can be safely ignored without consequence.

While I am personally opposed to labelling the challenges we face as ‘war’ – because that diminishes the risks faced by those who volunteer to put their own lives on the line in our name – we can argue semantics endlessly, to little avail. Similarly, we can spend much time and mental effort debating which individual is best qualified to drape themselves over the wheel of the sinking ship for a timeless photo opportunity, ala Turnbull/Abbott.

We need to be RUTHLESS. Ruthlessness is not a random, frenzied flailing of the limbs and rising inflections marinated in phlegm. Ruthlessness is calm, detached, evenly-paced steps to a rational, measurable outcome. For us. Cold, calculated, motivated. This is the wild. There are winners and losers.

We must be ruthless in identifying those who choose to threaten our opportunities, and equally ruthless in diminishing their opportunity to do so. Identify. Neutralise. Repeat.

There are a plethora of reasons why this complex concept may not work.

The easy option is to say “No” or “Too hard.”

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30 Responses to WX: Political Intelligence Entity

  1. stackja

    We must be ruthless in identifying those who choose to threaten our opportunities, and equally ruthless in diminishing their opportunity to do so. Identify. Neutralise. Repeat.

    ALP/Unions?

  2. A H

    How about privatising centrelink?

  3. BrettW

    Brilliant. Totally agree.

    For a start. The need to constantly remind the people about the strong Union influence on the ALP.

    Highlighting the many Union leaders who have been found helping themselves to Union funds (Thompson and Williamson in HSU, the NUW boss, the TWU guys in WA and their expensive utes, credit card usage by CFMEU in Qld to name just a few).

    False membership numbers by Unions (AWU under Shorten etc and TWU NSW overstating by almost double) for the purpose of getting more votes / power at Labor conferences.

    The impact of out of control Unions on the rest of the population. Think :
    CFMEU stand over tactics that increase building costs
    Strikes that delay hospitals and Government projects (and in recent case a Ronald McDonald House)
    Closed shop practices that result in more overtime but major staffing problems and poor service (ie. Qld Rail)

    The selling out of the workers on penalty rates by Shorten personally and the Shoppies Union regarding Coles, Woolies, KFC etc and the hypocrisy of anything Labor says about penalty rates.

    Over representation of former Union office holders in public office.

    To name just a few.

  4. Anthony Park

    I think the best use of your PIE would be in a show ot podcast like Last Week Tonight (with Comedian Jon Oliver). Oliver combines harmless comedy segments with well researched segments that criticise and deligitimise via mockery a person/organisation/programme (often conservative).

    Put the PIE to good use collecting data then put it in a humerous format with VFX etc.

  5. John Michelmore

    I see, so we replace the ABC with PIE, because a PIE in the face is too direct!

  6. incoherent rambler

    Based on the principle: “never give away a liberty or freedom to government, because you will never get it back without a revolt”. I think it is too late for the gentlemanly sport of politics to fix things.

    Rather than discuss PIE, can we discuss our we of the persecuted underground might survive the next decade?

  7. BoyfromTottenham

    Great article, Guest Author – you obviously know your political, military and intelligence history. I have a fair library of this kind of stuff myself.

    BrettW – you said ‘The need to constantly remind the people about the strong Union influence on the ALP.’ I would go further and remind everyone that the Unions created the ALP as their Political arm more than a century ago, but obviously have a tacit agreement with the ALP to never mention this inconvenient fact in public. This fact, of course, puts the relationship between the Unions and the ALP in an entirely different light to that presented in the MSM. For instance if many Unions are known to be corrupt, then what does say about their creature the ALP and the funding that the Unions provide to prop it up, and what of the overwhelming number of ex-Union folk being parachuted into safe ALP seats? I am constantly amazed at the failure of the NLP (or any other party really) to make, and keep on making this simple point to voters. But maybe they haven’t read any political or military history.

  8. Howard Hill

    We currently have no such entity or organisation dedicated to strategically defending our institutions and values.

    We did but it was subverted by government itself. It’s called the media.
    And you cannot fight violence without violence. Never bring a pen to a gun fight!

  9. Bela Bartok

    Shut down the ABC – 1/2 the job done!

  10. Snoopy

    It could be named GetDown!

  11. Zulu Kilo Two Alpha

    Great article, Guest Author – you obviously know your political, military and intelligence history. I have a fair library of this kind of stuff myself.

    As do I. Stephen Machett’s book “Secret Victory – The Intelligence War That Beat the I.R.A.” is required reading on the matter.

    I do agree with the need for ruthlessness. The “Marquis of Queensberry Rules” approach, favored by certain Liberal politicians, is totally ineffectual against the Leftist mindset that no Liberal Government can ever be legitimately elected.

  12. Speedbox

    Excellent article and I thoroughly agree with the sentiment.

    Some time ago in another thread I posted that whilst I was appalled and frustrated with the various assaults (and lack of effective response) on Conservative politics, I was in awe of the organisational capabilities of the Left.

    I joined Cory Bernardi’s group a while back but that seems like a very slow burn. And whilst it may eventually have some success, we (conservatives) have the capability and resources to confront our political enemies on two fronts.

    We Conservatives need a means to confront and ridicule the claims and outrageous actions of the Left. PIE sounds like a good place to start our own resistance.

  13. hzhousewife

    Occasionally I come across an articulate young person and I ask them what they are reading as a way of extending conversation. Last week I came across a 23 yr old reading about the NSW Obeid scandal (must be a book?). Where is the book about Dyson Heydon’s masterful enquiry into Trade Union Governance and Corruption ? It needs to be written. (Maybe it has and I don’t know).

  14. jupes

    Secondly, viewing our challenge through the prism of counter-insurgency – making appropriate adjustments of course for the civil, non-violent nature of the self-proclaimed ‘insurgents’ – would force us to view our enemies as a threat, rather than a mere inconvenience or nuisance that can be safely ignored without consequence.

    Counter-insurgency is a flawed and more often than not a failed strategy:

    Failures: Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.

    Partial success: The surge in Iraq (ultimate success still in the balance).

    Success: Malaya in the ’50s.

    A large part of counter-insurgency is winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people. The problem with that is that we will never win the hearts and minds of large portion of our enemy. They must be destroyed.

    The Sri Lankans eventually figured that out and changed tactics from counter-insurgency to destroying their enemy. They did a magnificent job of that and now there is peace in Sri Lanka (waves to Dr BeauGan).

    Perhaps we would be better off viewing our challenge through the prism of total war.

  15. .

    I’d get up to GetDown! – “Topher”‘s videos are very good at explaining things. Make him the comms. director?

  16. Grandma

    Both balls and brains would be needed. And where would these be found? In the government of the bedwetters? In a defence force which produced David Morrison?

  17. RobK

    The tentacles of the foe have pervaded into academia, environmentalism, animal liberation, feminism etc. Many of these movements get tax dollars. The Environmental Defenders Office, RSPCA, Landcare are just a few that come to mind. I was told there are some seventy registered enviro “stakeholders” that get government funding (I cant vouch for the accuracy of that claim). The tentacles extend to the UN in its many fields of influence (viz IPCC,UNHCR, ILO?). Various property rights groups I have been involved in have difficulty matching the might of the machinery of the left, especially funding and manpower. The foe is formidable and lack of traction in the fight against it is only rationalized by the thought that things would have been worse without the effort. The thrust of the article is a good one…..
    Herding Cats so to speak.

  18. PhillipW

    Love this idea. Would be keen to participate.

  19. WX

    The intention of this post was to plant a seed and observe who came along to water it.

  20. Perfidious Albino

    Well, sure as hell nothing else seems to be working…
    Even a straightforward counter propaganda poster, poster campaign would be a start – if just a small portion of the intelligence, humour and rapier wit regularly displayed on this site (and that’s just Stimpy) could be ‘weaponised’ it could have a powerful impact – even if only infuriating the lefty pinkoes at their own game.

  21. Tim Neilson

    the civil, non-violent nature of the self-proclaimed ‘insurgents’

    That’s the only part I disagree with.

    Conservative or libertarian groups organise events, getting lawful rights to use private premises, or proper permits to meet publicly, and the “progressives” turn up illegally, with one thing in mind, to crate violence.

    Haven’t you seen any of the leaked material about Clinton’s campaign paying people to go to Trump rallies to create violent incidents?

    We shouldn’t do the same thing back, but exposing the violent nature of the enemy is one of our most important and potentially useful tasks.

  22. Faye

    My hero is Nigel Farage. He is a PIEMAN. Twenty five years ago, he entered politics purely to fight for “…the defence of our values and institutions, and assist in degrading the ability and willingness of those who would seek to annihilate the same” because he couldn’t live with the fact that our soldiers in two World Wars had given up their lives for our freedoms.
    He has shown the world just how worthless the EU and its big brother the UN are. He has literally alone year after year ruthlessly chipped away at the bloated behemoth. He colourfully insults the EU money-suckers pointing out their blatant elitist righteousness to rule as they squirm and laugh it off.
    He is still a member of the EU to make sure that the culmination of his 25-year fight, Brexit, isn’t hijacked.
    My hero is brimming over with “Political Intelligence”!

  23. Zulu Kilo Two Alpha

    Failures: Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.

    Failed in Viet Nam, because the Americans didn’t understand counter insurgency warfare. One of the major reasons for the success in Malaya was the building of the Malaysian Police and Special Branch, yet, in Viet Nam, in the early 1960’s, when an insurgency could have been defeated, the Americans persisted in treating the Viet Cong as though they were speeding motorists, or petty criminals, and training and equipping the South Vietnamese National Police accordingly.

  24. Zulu Kilo Two Alpha

    Failures: Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan.

    I would be interested in your views on Algeria, 1954 – 1962.

  25. Muddy

    Zulu.
    An astute comment regarding the police role in counterinsurgencies. The Vietnamese Police Field Force (1966) had potential, but for various reasons – primarily the lack of political support, but also poor leadership, recruitment challenges, and command & control – failed to live up to initial expectations. U.S. interagency rivalry did not help. Douglas Valentine’s woeful book slanders several good Australians who were involved.

    Back on the topic: I think the whole point is that we need a new way of looking at things, and if we can take ideas from historical conflicts that worked, and adapt them, maybe we are not doomed after all.

  26. Zulu Kilo Two Alpha

    Douglas Valentine’s woeful book slanders several good Australians who were involved.

    My compliments, Muddy, and which book would that be?

  27. Muddy

    Zulu.
    The Phoenix Program
    by Douglas Valentine.
    I must admit that I have not read the hard copy book from cover to cover but elements of it online, so perhaps I’m being a bit harsh, though I do know that my go-to man for these things, Mark Moyar (with whom I know you are familiar) casts doubt on a number of the individuals Valentine relied on for anecdotal evidence of U.S. atrocities.
    I personally took issue with the ‘evidence’ of William Grieves who took over the PFF, and presents arse-about information on the two Australian instructors at the PFF Training Centre at Trai Mat (Da Lat). Valentine seems to have taken this BS on face value, but some of it can be easily disproved.

    Texas Tech University has a voluminous number of documents of the period, some relating to ICEX/Phung Hoang/Phoenix, though relatively few regarding the PFF as they fell out of favour with the powers-that-be.

    Phoenix remains one of the Left’s favourite memes about the danger of a state military, though in recent years they have certainly been successful in beginning to infiltrate and dissolve that ‘threat’ from within.

  28. Tailgunner

    Even a straightforward counter propaganda poster, poster campaign would be a start – if just a small portion of the intelligence, humour and rapier wit regularly displayed on this site (and that’s just Stimpy) could be ‘weaponised’ it could have a powerful impact – even if only infuriating the lefty pinkoes at their own game.

    This.
    Count me in. My email is attached to my gravatar, or ask Sinc for it.
    I’ve been in communication with Generation Identitaire in Europe. They know how to do these things well.
    I’ve just begun reconnaissance of likely sites in Yarragrad. It’s a target-rich environment!

  29. Gilas

    Tim Neilson
    #2455048, posted on July 30, 2017 at 10:24 pm

    Of all the comments above, it is the only one which resonates and might get some results.
    Studying, and acting on, Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals is at the root of the solution, all the other aspirational wishes won’t do a damn thing.

    The idea that a PIE could be instituted without coercive means and methods, in the current political climate, is so laughable I suspect the OP is taking the piss.

  30. Combine Dave

    Can this be deployed alongside the Fisk doctorine?

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