“Market failure” is an ancient economic term which is largely confined to when a natural monopoly occurs and the firm is able to make more money by restricting supply than if that supply were to be provided by many firms in competition with each other. In other cases, the market system has means of ensuring that the outcome, if not perfect, is as good as it gets.
However half-trained economists have latched on to the phrase and reinterpreted it to mean any outcome that does not accord to their own thinking of what should be provide, chosen and consumed.
Hence, those using economic jargon to justify market intervention claim there is:
- consumer ignorance of what they might best spend their money on offered as an excuse for market failure.
- consumers are judged to be myopic in excessively valuing today’s savings against those available tomorrow.
- businessmen fail to invest appropriately because of inadequate certainty about the future and businesses fail to invest because the ‘first mover’ is seen to lose out to those following the trail.
- consumers are not making the best decisions because products like buildings are rented not owned and the owner takes decisions on the assumption that the lessee will not assign the correct weighting to features like their energy bills.
- consumers fail to make the appropriate product decisions because the package of services in, for example a car, makes too many trade-off and sacrifices those the economic policy maker considers best serve society.
A rich economic literature has disproven all of these so-called market failures.
Yet they are trotted out in abundance by those wishing to impose their own values on consumers and producers. Nowhere is this more evident than with the latest paper by the Grattan Institute on carbon taxes.
Grattan was funded by a $30 million raid on the taxpayer by ALP governments supplemented by funds from businesses that seek to ingratiate themselves with those same governments. It is staffed by people who use economic jargon to justify government intervention, especially in the sharp end of policy activity, energy and carbon markets. And it is located in the University of Melbourne, just one tertiary institution the administration of which has fallen to the long march of ALP insiders.
Even so it is unable to maintain a consistent line on its centerpiece policy theme. Here is a summary of their positions in its two year odyssey through carbon saving matters.
The Grattan Peregrinations
November 2009
There is a possibility that without a floor to carbon prices, lower-emission electricity generation won’t be built in time unless there is direct government subsidy – which would somewhat defeat the ultimate purpose of a carbon pollution reduction scheme. Until future carbon prices are assured, banks and investors will be reluctant to add to power capacity.
September 2010
Markets would be better than government at driving innovation at the pace and cost necessary to meet Australia’s climate targets. In effect, this sets a floor-price for carbon emissions, something like the reserve price in a house auction. It creates more certainty for the builders of power plants, and businesses investing to reduce their direct emissions.
October 2010
The flexibility of a cap and trade scheme makes it an attractive instrument for achieving the emissions reductions that Australia committed to as part of the Kyoto process. By augmenting it with price caps and floors we can put more certainty around the economic assumptions about the costs of emissions reductions that were the basis of these commitments.
December 2010
Government and other experts consistently underestimated how much industry innovates and adapts. As a result government targets to reduce pollution were regularly achieved faster, and at lower cost than originally expected. It also finds that experts were routinely wrong in their predictions about which particular measures would be the lowest cost.
We should use broad-based pricing schemes that minimise government actively choosing in advance which projects and technologies to reduce emissions.
April 2011
Market mechanisms show by far the greatest promise for achieving substantial emissions reductions by 2020 and the longer term. Under a market mechanism, government legislates a price on pollution, or for avoiding pollution, and then allows businesses to determine how they wish to respond to the price.
Market mechanisms work because they minimise the need for government to predict the future. They provide businesses and individuals with certainty and flexibility.
Grant tendering schemes are opposed because they involve a highly complex and ad hoc approach to funding abatement activities. Grant tendering programs tend to fall into two broad categories:
• Programs like the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Program, the NSW Energy Savings Fund and the Green Building Fund.
• Programs that primarily aim to develop and commercialise immature greenhouse abatement technologies and include the Solar Cities, Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Program, Solar and CCS flagships.
October 2011
Earlier this year, Grattan Institute released an analysis of the outcomes of a range of policy interventions, for which reducing greenhouse gas emissions was a core objective. The analysis showed clearly that market mechanisms not only deliver the outcome at lowest cost and compare more than favourably with schemes such as capital grants, they also produce benefits in innovation that are far better than would be delivered otherwise.
Project proponents and their financiers will always favour feed-in tariffs or power purchase agreements since the firm revenue stream is far more bankable than taking market exposure to renewable energy targets or portfolio standards. Whenever industry advocates a specific support mechanism (they never call it a subsidy), a simple question of why they would do so will usually reveal commercial alignment.
Pricing carbon. Third myth: Complementary measures are needed because the carbon price is not high enough. If government responds inappropriately .. it will either make the problem worse or introduce a new problem and a new set of industry concerns. For example, a renewable target is introduced because the ETS price is not high enough to support renewable energy; then a feed-in tariff is introduced because the REC price is not high enough for solar energy; then segmented feed-in tariffs are introduced because the FIT only supports the cheapest solar etc. And, of course, every change, or even proposed change, triggers a response from those who have invested on the basis of a credible and predictable market.
February 2012
The carbon pricing scheme, while a good start, is not enough. Policy approach should be
- Set upper and lower bounds on longer-term emission caps
- Maintain and expand R&D for solar, geothermal etc
- Reduced subsidies to electricity prices, cease contracts at favourable prices to aluminium, smelters, increase time-of-use metre roll-out
- Increase network support for renewable generation